Authenticated key exchange (AKE) has been one of the most famous cryptographic primitives,which enables two or multiple parties to not only establish a session key but also authenticate the identities of parties involved in the key exchange.That is,AKE is widely used to establish a secure channel for parties over a public network,such as the Internet,so that the underlying network-based applications carried by the communication partners parties can be therefore well protected.As the importance of AKE,it is always the primary target of network attackers.With the emerging of new cyber technologies,novel attacks against AKE protocols have sprung up in an endless stream,which also pushes forward the development of AKE protocols with stronger security.In this book,we are going to introduce state-of-the-art research works,which are relevant to AKE with strong security.These works are lead by Zheng YANG.
楊錚，2013年獲得德國波鴻魯爾大學工學博士學位，2021年起擔任西南大學計算機與信息科學學院（軟件學院）特聘教授、碩士生導師。曾任芬蘭赫爾辛基大學、新加坡科學與設計大學博士后研究員。主要研究方向為密碼學、工業互聯網安全、區塊鏈、隱私保護、大數據安全等。先后主持和主研了國家自然科學基金、重慶市自然科學基金等近20項科研項目。目前已經在INFOCOM,ACSAC，ESORICS,PKC, Euro S&P, AsiaCCS,CT-RSA,ACNS，IEEE Transactions onIndustrial Informatics，ACMTransactions on Sensor Networks 等國內外高水平學術會議和期刊上錄用和發表學術論文50余篇。并獲國家發明專利授權3項，且先后擔任20余個國際學術期刊審稿人和國際學術會議委員。
封面
書名頁
版權頁
Abstract
Acknowledgements
Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction
Background
Structure
Part Ⅰ Preliminary
Chapter 2 Cryptographic Primitives and Complexity Assumptions
2.1 Notations
2.2 Negligible Functions
2.3 Key Exchange Protocols
2.4 Digital Signature Schemes
2.5 Public Key Encryption Schemes
2.6 Key Encapsulation Mechanism Schemes
2.7 Non-Interactive Key Exchange Protocols
2.8 Tag-based Authentication Schemes
2.9 Message Authentication Code
2.10 Collision-Resistant Hash Functions
2.11 Target Collision-Resistant Hash Functions
2.12 Pseudo-Random Functions
2.13 Double Pseudo-Random Functions
2.14 Min-entropy and Strong Randomness Extractors
2.15 Weak Programmable Hash Functions
2.16 Bilinear Groups
2.17 Multilinear Groups
2.18 Complexity Assumptions
Part Ⅱ Security Model
Chapter 3 Towards Modelling Perfect Forward Secrecy in Two-message Authenticated Key Exchange
3.1 Two-party Security Models
3.2 New Results on Perfect Forward Secrecy for TMAKE
Chapter 4 Randomized Authentication Primitive Problem in Key Exchange
4.1 Security Definitions Revisit
4.2 Randomized Authentication Primitive Problems
4.3 Solutions for Avoiding RAP problem
Chapter 5 A New Strong Security Model for Stateful Authenticated Group Key Exchange
5.1 Execution Environment
5.2 Adversarial Model
5.3 Secure AGKE Protocols
Part Ⅲ Cryptanalysis of AKE Protocols
Chapter 6 On Security Analysis of an After-the-fact Leakage Key Exchange Protocol
6.1 The ASB protocol
6.2 Security Analysis of ASB
Chapter 7 Cryptanalysis of a Generic TMAKE Protocol from KEM
7.1 The KF Scheme
7.2 On the Insecurity of the KF Scheme
7.3 Incorrect Security Reduction of the KF Scheme
Chapter 8 Cryptanalysis of a Generic TMAKE Protocol from NIKE
8.1 The BJS Scheme
8.2 The Insecurity and Improvement of the BJS scheme
8.3 An Improvement Solution of the BJS Scheme
Part Ⅳ New AKE Constructions
Chapter 9 Simpler Generic Constructions for Strongly Secure One-round Key Exchange from Weaker Assumptions
9.1 Generic AKE from NIKE
9.2 A Generic AKE Construction from simplified NIKE
9.3 Efficiency Comparison
Chapter 10 New Constructions for (Multiparty) One-round Key Exchange with Strong Security
10.1 ADDH-based ORKE Protocol
10.2 An Efficient Multiparty ORKE Protocol
10.3 Efficiency Comparison
Chapter 11 Two-message Key Exchange with Strong Security from Ideal Lattices
11.1 A Generic TMAKE Construction from OTKEM
11.2 An OTKEM from Ring-LWE
11.3 Comparison
Chapter 12 A Stateful Authenticated Group Key Exchange Protocol with Strong Security
12.1 A Strongly Secure stAGKE Protocol
Conclusions
Bibliography
新書資訊